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Secessionist movements have more than doubled in the last century, and yet very few 
movements actually succeed in gaining independence. This research study has examined 
four different cases of secessionist movements in order to identify key factors that make a 
secessionist movement more likely to succeed at gaining independence.  The first two 
cases are the successful secession of Bangladesh and South Sudan, and the last two cases 
are the unsuccessful attempts at secession by the Quebecois in Quebec, Canada and the 
Kurds in the Middle East territories of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. The data shows that 
there are four main criteria that make a secessionist movement more likely to achieve 
independence: the movement must have endured major injustices by the parent state; it 
must have majority support in the territory that wishes to secede; the parent state must be 
weakened; and finally, it must have external support from the international community 
and neighboring countries. Most secessionist movements that have achieved 
independence have done so after violent conflict and wars. Despite this fact, nationalist 
groups have not been deterred in their demands for independence.  Therefore, 
understanding secessionist movements and what it will take for them to achieve 
independence is an important topic for global security and how the international 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1945, there were 74 independent countries; today, there are 195.1 The surge in 
the number of independent nations over the past half-century can largely be attributed to 
the breakup of colonial empires and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but more 
specifically, the idea of self-determination.  While definitions vary somewhat, according 
to Robert A. Friedlander “self-determination is often considered to be the ‘right’ of a 
‘people’ to shape their own political, economic, and cultural destinies.”2  The principle of 
self-determination is generally attributed to President Woodrow Wilson who advocated 
for future territorial settlements to be based on the criteria of nationality; a criterion that 
helped shape the future of international affairs.3  While Wilson genuinely believed that 
the right of communities to govern themselves would lead to more stable peace around 
the world, he likely did not intend for the concept to create a wave of ethnic and 
nationalist groups aspiring to have an independent state of their own.4  In 1915, there 
were eight secessionist movements seeking their own independent state; in 2015 there 
were over fifty.5  While self-determination was a driving force behind the independence 
of post-colonial territories, the concept has been less successful in aiding secessionist 
movements outside of the decolonization paradigm.  However, the low success rate 
outside of decolonization has done little to deter the rise in secessionist movements 
around the world.  
                                                             
1 Diego Muro and Eckart Woertz, Secession and Counter-Secession: An International Relations 
Perspective, (Barcelona: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 2018), 11 
2 Robert A. Friendlander, “International Politics,” in R. Vashum, “Self-Determination: Principles, 
Meanings and Practices,” Indian Anthropologist, Vol 26, No. 1 (June, 1996), 65  
3 Ibid. 65 
4 Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of ‘National Self-Determination’: A Reconsideration,” 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 2002), 434 
5 Tanisha Fazal, “Go Your Own Way: Why Rising Separatism Might Lead to More Conflict ,” Foreign 
Affairs, (July/August 2018). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/go-your-own-way 
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The Bengalis of East Pakistan were the first successful dissident group to exercise 
secessionist self-determination outside the process of decolonization, gaining 
independence from Pakistan in 1971.6  In 2011, South Sudan gained its independence 
becoming the newest country and the last successful secessionist movement to date. Only 
three other countries have gained their independence through secessionist movements 
since the end of decolonization, Eritrea, East Timor and Kosovo.7  Yet countless other 
movements have tried, some peacefully and others with brutal conflict and wars.  This 
paper will examine two successful secessionist movements, Bangladesh and South 
Sudan, as well as two unsuccessful movements, the Kurds and the Quebecois.  The 
question for this research is; what factors make secessionists movements successful in 
some cases but not in others? The goal will be to determine if there are key elements that 
make secession more likely to succeed. The research will look at the reasons why the 
particular group wanted to secede; the process the movement went about achieving their 
goal; and the reaction from the international community.  While current secession 
movements have been more peaceful than in the past, the potential for conflict and 
violence remains high in some areas of the world.  Understanding secessionist 
movements, the reasons they wish to secede as well as the process they will take to 
achieve their goals and reaction from the parent state is critical for trying to maintain 
peace and security in the global world.  
 
 
                                                             
6 M. Rafiqul Islam, “Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra and 
Bangladesh,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep. 1985), 212 
7 Kosovo declared its independence in 2008 and is recognized by 98 UN members, however it is not a 
member of the United Nations. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the theory of self-determination has been studied since World War I, there 
was no clear theory of secession until the 1990s when the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
led to Soviet states gaining their independence.  Allen Buchanan was the first to try and 
come up with a theory of secession, and others have since followed.8  However, the 
literature on secession focuses mainly on the legal and moral right to secede, but focuses 
less on what makes a secessionist movement successful and hence worthwhile.  This 
literature review will look into the emergence of the national self-determination principle 
and how that set the stage for the growing secessionist movements and the theory of 
secession.  It will also explore how scholars have viewed the right to secede, many 
focusing mostly on who should have the right to secede on a moral basis, while others 
focus more on the legal right of secession. It will also look at how some scholars argue 
that partitioning a state into homogenous territories would help end ethnic violence and 
civil wars. While the literature does a decent job of framing who should have a 
theoretical right to secede, it does little to address the validity of their arguments in terms 
of if a secessionist movement has a chance of achieving their goal for independence.   
The Emergence of Nationalist Self-Determination  
On January 8, 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson went before Congress to 
deliver what he considered the basic principles of just and lasting peace.  Wilson’s 
famous Fourteen Points speech has been attributed with bringing the idea of national self-
determination to the forefront of foreign policy and playing a key role in the political 
reconstruction of Europe and the world.  Not only did the principle of self-determination 
                                                             
8 Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2 (Jan 1991) 
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guide the peace process after the First and Second World Wars but it was also one of the 
chief goals of the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations.9  Article 1 of 
the Charter of the United Nations stated:  
The Purposes of the United Nations are: … 2. To develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace.10  
 
Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 declared, “All peoples 
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”11  
Therefore, under international law, minority groups that qualify as “peoples” have the 
right to self-determination and the ability to freely determine their political fate.12  The 
principle of self-determination largely guided international politics in the 20th century as 
peoples began appealing to the advocates of self-determination in order to form their own 
states.  However, the principle of self-determination was largely envisioned as a last 
resort for colonized peoples who were oppressed by their colonial governments.13  
Therefore, the self-determination and secession of a people from an existing sovereign 
state is still a matter of great debate and interpretation. 
 There is no right of secession in international law, according to Milena Sterio 
“international law merely tolerates secession in instances of external self-determination, 
                                                             
9 Hans Kohn, “The United Nations and National Self-Determination,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 20, No. 
4 (Oct. 1958) 
10 United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945. https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/chapter-i/index.html 
11 Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2 (Jan 1991) 329 
12 Milena Sterio, “Self-Determination and Secession in International Law: The cases of Kurdistan and 





where a people is colonized or oppressed.”14  However, in other instances when a 
secessionist movement was attempting to secede from a just state where they are not 
being oppressed, international law remained neutral and left the dispute to be handled by 
the domestic law of the state and political negotiations between the parent state and 
secessionist group.15  In cases where a secessionist movement violates the fundamental 
norms of international law, like using force to seize territory, secession is prohibited 
under international law.16   
Allen Buchanan has been one of the leading scholars on secession theory, arguing 
that the right of self-determination, or what he also calls the “normative nationalist 
principle,” is one of the least plausible arguments for secession.17  According to 
Buchanan the main difficulty with this justification is the meaning of “peoples”, and the 
potential for there being too many claims of different cultures, ethnicities, languages, etc. 
to make self-determinations for all peoples realistic, stating, “if the number of ethnic 
cultural groups or peoples is not fixed but may increase, the normative nationalist 
principle is a recipe for limitless political fragmentation.18  Another reason why self-
determination is not a viable argument according to Buchanan is because there will likely 
be more ethnic and cultural groups than available territory, stating, “it is hard to see how 
the mere existence of such a group could generate a valid claim to territory on its 
behalf.”19   
Theories of Secession 




17 Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” 328 
18 Ibid. 328 
19 Ibid. 329 
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 According to Buchanan, there are two types of normative theories of secession, a 
“Remedial Right Only” and a “Primary Right” to secede.  The Remedial Right Only 
theory asserts, “a group has a general right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain 
injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy or last resort.”20  Whereas the 
Primary Right theory claims, “certain groups can have a (general) right to secede in the 
absence of injustice.”21  The remedial right only theory that Buchanan subscribes to says 
a group only has the right to secede if, “the physical survival of its members is threatened 
by the state” or “its previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the state.”22 
Remedial right only theorists have different views on what constitutes an injustice or if 
their grievances warrant secession, however, they all agree that there is no right to secede 
from a just state.23  Remedial right only theorists also recognize “special” rights to 
secession.  Special rights could include the state granting a right to secede; the right to 
secede is included in the constitution; or the original creation of the state included the 
implicit or explicit assumption that secession at a later point was permissible.24  
 Primary Right Theorists do not limit secession to being a means to rectify an 
injustice but instead identify conditions that groups must satisfy to warrant secession.25  
There are two main classes of primary right theories, Ascriptive Group Theories and 
Associative Group Theories. Ascriptive Group theories argue that groups with defined 
ascriptive characteristics, like sharing a common culture, history or language, have the 
right to secede. Whereas Associative Group theories argue that there need not be any 
                                                             
20 Allen Buchanan, “Theories of Secession,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 1997) 34-
35 
21 Ibid. 35 
22 Ibid. 37 
23 Ibid. 36-37 
24 Ibid. 36 
25 Ibid. 35 
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common ascriptitve characteristics but simply a group that desires their own state has the 
right to secede.26  Buchanan referred to this as the pure plebiscite theory, meaning, “any 
group that can constitute a majority (or, on some accounts, a “substantial” majority) in 
favor of secession within a portion of the state has the right to secede.”27  Scholars like 
Buchanan and Lea Brilmayer argue in favor of remedial right only theory, while Harry 
Beran and Christopher Wellman argue in favor of the primary right theory.  There are 
also a few scholars like Donald Horowitz and Michael Jewkes argue against secession all 
together.  
Buchanan sides with the remedial right only theory and calls out two main 
arguments for what injustices constitute secession, rectificatory justice and discriminatory 
redistribution. According to Buchanan, rectificatory justice “contends that a region has 
the right to secede if it was unjustly incorporated into a larger unit from which its 
members wish to secede.”28  Some argue that rectificatory justice is the only valid 
justification for secession.  For example, Lea Brilmayer asserts that a valid territorial 
claim is essential to justify secession, more specifically, a direct territorial claim where a 
“group is entitled to a particular territory on its own merits, as a consequence of 
international law concerning rightful acquisition.29  While Buchanan agrees that a 
historical territorial claim is a less problematic argument for secession, he believes that it 
is too narrow an argument and that there are other valid ways to make claim to a 
territory.30  The other argument Buchanan makes for a remedial right to secession is the 
                                                             
26 Ibid. 38 
27 Ibid. 39 
28 Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” 329 
29 Lea Brilmayer, “Secession and the Two Types of Territorial Claims,” Faculty Scholarship Theory 4879 
(2015), 328 
30 Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” 330 
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discriminatory redistribution argument, when a government “implements taxation 
schemes or regulatory policies or economic programs that systematically work to the 
disadvantage of that group while benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways.”31 
Buchanan points out that this argument plays a central role in most secession movements 
and notes that this is an example of why secession can be justified even in the absence of 
a historical territorial grievance.32  Primary right theorists argue that remedial right 
theories are too narrow and do not account for other justifiable reasons for secession. 
 Harry Beran, a primary right theorist, has written in favor of the consent theory of 
political obligation, which contends, “consent is a necessary condition for there being an 
authority relationship between a state and its members.”33  Beran believes that a right to 
secede goes hand in hand with the consent theory and that any group is justified in 
seceding, if it meets two conditions. One, the group constitutes a substantial majority in 
its portion of the state; and two, the group is able to acquire the resources necessary to 
create a viable independent state.34  Christopher Wellman is another primary right 
theorist that holds similar views to Beran.  However, Wellman does not believe that 
nationalist self-determination alone constitutes a justifiable reason for secession.  Instead, 
Wellman contends that any group that resides in a territory has the right to form its own 
state if the group constitutes a majority in that territory, the state it forms will be able to 
carry out the legitimate functions of a state, and that severing the territory will not impair 
the existing states ability to carry on effectively.35  While Wellman argues that groups do 
                                                             
31 Ibid. 330 
32 Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” 330 
33 Harry Beran, “In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority,” Ethics, Vol. 87, 
No. 3 (Apr. 1977)  
34 Buchanan. “Theories of Secession,” 39 
35 Ibid. 39-40 
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have the right to political self-determination, he believes that the right to secession should 
be based more on the political abilities of the group to ensure that secession will not 
cause instability for the new or existing state.36    
Arguments against Secession 
 Donald Horowitz takes a different approach by arguing that secession cannot 
create a homogeneous successor state and therefore is not the answer to solving ethnic 
conflict, violence or minority oppression.37  Instead, he believes that efforts should be 
taken to improve the conditions of minorities in their existing state and not encourage 
them to seek independence. He goes further to state that even the existence of a right to 
secede “is likely to dampen efforts of coexistence in the undivided state” and will likely 
make matters worse for the minority group.38  Michael Jewkes also argues that secession 
may not be a viable option, and that instead federalism is the only way to provide self-
determination for concentrated national minorities.39  Jewkes asserts that multinational 
federalism, which grants national minorities significant devolved competences, enhanced 
central representation, and constitutional entrenchment, would secure sub-state political 
autonomy and allow for national self-determination without secession.40  Both Horowitz 
and Jewkes base their arguments on the fact that secession is rarely, if ever, a viable or 
likely option and that there is a significant gap in the current literature on how minority 
groups can coexist in a heterogeneous society without the need to secede.  
Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars 
                                                             
36 Wellman, Christopher, “The Truth in the Nationalist Principle,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 
40. No. 4 (October 2003), 266 
37 Donald Horowitz, “The Right to Secede?” Nomos, Vol. 45 (2003), 50 
38 Ibid. 50-51 
39 Michael Jewkes. “Self-Determination Without Secession,” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 
(April 2014). 149 
40 Ibid. 150-153 
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 While Horowitz and Jewkes argue that secession is not the answer to solving 
ethnic conflict, others like John Mearsheimer and Chaim Kaufmann argue that 
partitioning a state is sometimes the only solution for stopping ethnic violence and civil 
wars.  In his article in The New York Times in 1993 “Shrink Bosnia to Save It,” 
Mearsheimer argued that redrawing borders and creating ethnically homogenous states 
for Bosnians, Croatians, and Serbians would be the only way to stop the fighting in the 
region.41  Kaufmann also suggests that partitioning states is the only way to ensure the 
security and safety of peoples endangered by ethnic civil wars.42  Kaufmann emphasizes 
that opposing groups must be separated into “defensible ethnic enclaves” in order to 
create true national homelands.43  Mearsheimer and Kaufmann both argue that states that 
have experienced ethnic violence and wars are unlikely to ever be able to coexist 
peacefully, and therefore partitioning the territory into ethnically homogeneous states is 
the best hope for peace. 
Conclusion 
 The literature on secession theory mainly focuses on when a group has a 
theoretical right to secede, but less on the likelihood that secession will be possible.  This 
research study will look to go beyond whether a group has a theoretical right to secession 
by instead examining when secessionist movements have actually been successful versus 
when they have not, in hopes of better identifying key factors that make secession 
plausible.  While international law embraces the principle of self-determination, it does 
not contain a concrete right to secession. Buchanan’s remedial right only theory, which 
                                                             
41 John J. Mearsheimer, “Shrink Bosnia to Save It,” The New York Times (March 31, 1993), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/31/opinion/shrink-bosnia-to-save-it.html 
42 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security, Vol. 
20, No. 4 (Spring, 1996), 137 
43 Ibid.  
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states that a group has the right to secede if it has suffered major injustices and has a 
rightful claim to territory, is the closest theory that reflects actual cases that have been 
accepted in the international community.  
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODS 
This research study will examine four different cases of secessionist movements, 
the Bengali, the South Sudanese, the Kurds, and the Quebecois. It will be a qualitative 
analysis, using document review to examine the data for each case study.  It will focus on 
three questions to guide the research and help determine why two of the cases were 
successful at gaining independence and why two of the cases were not successful. For the 
context of this paper, a successful secession movement is defined as the group gaining 
full independence from the parent state.   
The first question will examine what the grievances were for the particular group 
and why they wanted to secede.  This section will explore whether the group was 
claiming a remedial right to secede or a primary right to secede.  It is expected that only 
groups that have a remedial right to secede, meaning they have suffered major injustices 
by the parent state and have a rightful claim to the territory, will have been successful in 
seceding. For this paper, major injustices refer to violations of basic human rights, 
oppression, and violence against a specific population in the society. The second question 
will focus on the process or actions the secessionist group took during their struggle for 
independence and how the parent state or government responded.  The actions taken by 
the secessionist movement and the response by the parent state will be important in 
understanding why the group was able to move forward with theirs goals of 
independence or how the parent state was able to effectively stop the movement from 
 12 
achieving independence.  It is expected that most parent states are not willing to let a 
group secede, and will likely respond with opposition or violence in order to undermine 
and quell the aspirations of the secessionist group.  It is also expected that cases that 
experience extreme violence and conflict will be more likely to achieve independence 
than those that take a more democratic approach to secession. And lastly, this research 
will look at how the international community responded to the secessionist movement, 
did it lend support in any way (either to the secession group or the parent state) or did it 
not get involved one way or the other?  It is expected that the data will show that 
international community support will be an important determining factor on whether 
secession was ultimately successful or not.  If the international community supported the 
secessionist groups’ desire to secede, they will be more likely to achieve their goal.  
However, if the international community sided with the parent state or did not get 
involved on either side, the secessionist movement will be less likely to achieve 
independence.  International community support will be measured by substantial 
assistance through diplomatic support, financial assistance, military assistance (troops or 
weapons), and UN Security Council actions (statements or resolutions). Each of the four 
cases will be broken into the following sections, Historical Context, Grievances, Road to 




 Bangladesh declared its independence from Pakistan on March 27, 1971, but the 
road to independence came at a high cost. The issues in Pakistan began from its creation, 
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when the British left India in 1947 and hastily partitioned the region.  In the era of 
decolonization and self-determination, the British were forced to deal with the diverse 
population of Muslims and Hindus and the demands of the Muslim minority to have their 
own separate and independent homeland.44  In hopes of ensuring a peaceful region and 
adhering to the principle of self-determination, the British partitioned India along 
religious lines, placing the bulk of India’s Muslim population in a newly created country 
of Pakistan.45  Unfortunately, the two Muslim majority regions in India were located in 
the northwest and the northeast Indian Dominion, which led to an awkward separation of 
Pakistan territory with India in the middle.  Following Pakistan’s independence, the 
capital was designated in the West Pakistan city of Karachi.  East Pakistan was made up 
mostly of Bengali people, who had their own history, culture and language that were 
separate to that of Western Pakistanis.   
Grievances 
The issues between West Pakistan and East Pakistan developed in the early stages 
of Pakistan’s independence. East Pakistani grievances over the national language, 
military, and economic issues would all lead to a growing nationalist spirit of the Bengali.  
Disputes over the national language began shortly after Pakistan’s independence when 
the central government declared Urdu to be the national language of Pakistan. The 
Bengali wanted to ensure their language of Bangla received equal recognition in Pakistan 
society, however the central government was adamant about uniting Pakistan under one 
language.46 A bitter debate ensued, leading to major protests and the deaths of several 
                                                             
44 Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer, “Bangladesh: Two Independence Movements,” in Independence 
Movements and Their Aftermath. Center for Strategic & International Studies, (January 24, 2019), 13 
45 Ibid. 14 
46 Ibid. 14 
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students in East Pakistan.  Eventually a compromise was reached that designated two 
official languages for Pakistan, Urdu and Bangla.  However, the contentious issue put the 
Bengali on the defensive from the very beginning of independence, which ultimately 
“damaged Pakistan’s fragile unity and birthed a strong cultural movement in East 
Pakistan that significantly contributed to the growth of Bengali nationalism.”47   
The Bengali also had major grievances over how the military was being run and 
how they were being economically supported. The Pakistani military mostly consisted of 
Punjabi and Pashtun ethnic groups, a holdover from the British who only recruited from 
what they called the “martial races,” while the Bengali were virtually excluded from the 
military altogether.48  West Pakistanis and the military dominated Pakistan’s governing 
institutions, determining security, foreign and economic policies.49  The East Pakistani 
were not only convinced that West Pakistanis was profiting more from their positions, but 
they were also concerned that the military strategy would only focus on West Pakistan 
and leave East Pakistan vulnerable in the event of an attack.50  The Bengali were also 
concerned that the economic assistance from the United States and its allies following the 
independence of Pakistan was only going to the West, while the East was being 
neglected.51  The East Pakistanis increasingly felt that they were victims of deliberate and 
unfair discrimination by the central government in West Pakistan.52  But despite their 
understandable grievances and subservient position, the East Pakistanis attempted to 
                                                             
47 Ibid. 15 
48 Ibid. 15 
49 Ibid. 15 
50 Ibid. 15 
51 Ibid. 15 
52 Ibid. 16 
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work with the Pakistan government and fight for their rights through political 
organization. 
Road to Secession  
In hopes of changing their political situation and end the government 
discrimination, East Pakistanis first relied on political organization and legal change as 
their methods for demanding a more equitable role in national affairs.  One of their first 
actions was forming the “United Front” coalition, which was comprised of opposition 
leaders and parties that sought to challenge the incumbent Muslim League in provincial 
elections.53  The United Front ran on a platform that demanded more autonomy in the 
region, as well as other reforms in regards to agriculture, trade, and political arrests and 
detentions.54  However, the central government in Karachi found these demands to be 
unacceptable and would not tolerate any dissidence from the Bengali or the United Front.  
The United Front eventually dissolved and the East Pakistanis were back to square one 
with unstable political groups and frequent intervention by the central government.55  
 The Bengali took political action again when the strongest political party in the 
east, the Awami (People’s) Muslim League, “radically changed the focus of Bengali 
demands.”56  The President of the league, Sheikh Mujib, set forth a Six Point Program 
that went much further than the United Front demands, calling for, “two sovereign 
autonomous states, limiting the power of the federal government, new currency 
provisions, autonomous taxation and revenue collection, a new foreign exchange 
                                                             
53 Ibid. 16 
54 Ibid. 16-17 
55 Ibid. 17 
56 Ibid. 18 
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arrangement, and the establishment of an East Pakistani armed force.”57  The central 
government under President Ayub took the Six Point Program as a strategy for East 
Pakistan to secede and therefore blocked the agenda and jailed the Mujib and other 
Awami Leaguers.58  Ayub eventually resigned from the Presidency after increased 
opposition and a failed attempt to bring opposition leaders together to discuss 
fundamental constitutional questions.59   
The new president, Yahya Kahn promised early elections for a National Assembly 
and issued a “decree stipulating that provincial representation in the newly chosen body 
would be allocated on the basis of population.”60  The Awami League handily swept the 
elections in East Pakistan, winning 160 of the province’s 162 National Assembly seats, a 
win that would have set in motion the division of power between the East and the West. 
Yahya and his commanders were shocked by the outcome and what it meant for the 
stability of the country, and therefore delayed calling the first meeting of the assembly 
and instituted martial law.61  Major strikes and riots erupted in East Pakistan as Sheikh 
Mujib called for civil disobedience.62  Mujib and President Khan met to try and reach an 
agreement and avoid war, but instead Mujib was arrested and around 80,000 West 
Pakistani soldiers began what would be known as Operation Searchlight, a massacre that 
would leave an estimated 500,000 to over 3 million dead.63  The atrocities carried out by 
the Pakistani military gained international attention, the Indian Prime Minister being the 
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first to label the attacks as “genocide.”64  The massacre of the East Pakistanis finally 
ended when India came to the aid of the East Pakistanis and West Pakistan declared war 
on India.65  A decisive victory by India allowed East Pakistan to gain their independence 
and declare the new country of Bangladesh. 
International Community Reaction 
 The international community was well aware of the atrocities taking place by the 
Pakistani soldiers in East Pakistan, but the reaction on how to respond was mixed 
between the leading powers of the world.  The United States considered Pakistan an ally 
in the region, and yet, the American consul-general in Dhaka and the U.S. Ambassador to 
India saw what was happening in East Pakistan and both called on President Richard 
Nixon to end U.S. support for the Pakistani government.66 However, President Nixon and 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were hesitant to end their support of the 
Pakistani regime.  In the midst of the Cold War, the United States was more concerned 
with the Soviet Union’s influence in India than it was with the Pakistan military’s actions 
in East Pakistan.67  The British government also struggled to get involved with what was 
happening in Pakistan, labeling the crisis as a civil war and taking the approach of non-
interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.68  India and the Soviets attempted to raise the 
issue at the United Nations, however the international community sided with non-
interference in the internal affairs of a state.69   





68 Sue Levenstein and Robert Hathaway. “The Secession of East Pakistan in 1971 and the Question of 
Genocide,” Wilson Center, December 15, 2010, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-secession-east-
pakistan-1971-and-the-question-genocide 
69 Ibid.  
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India on the other hand did not have the luxury of ignoring what was happening in 
East Pakistan.  As millions of East Pakistanis flooded into India for refuge, the Indian 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to take action against Pakistan. India provided 
training and sanctuary to the East Pakistani armed resistance and Pakistan responded by 
attacking Indian airfields, leading to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.70  The war only 
lasted 13 days, during which India swiftly brought the Pakistan government to its knees.  
Following the decisive win by India, the Bengalis declared their independence from the 
weakened Pakistan.  The international community had little ability to object, and soon 
recognized Bangladesh as an independent country. India’s support was critical in the 
independence of Bangladesh.   
South Sudan 
Historical Context 
South Sudan declared its independence from the greater Sudan on July 9, 2011.  
However, like Bangladesh, the road to independence came at a great cost. The region of 
Sudan contains a wide diversity of peoples, with an estimated 600 ethnic groups or tribes 
speaking more than 400 languages.71  Broadly speaking, the region is divided by the Arab 
heritage in the north and the African heritage in the south, the groups heavily divided 
along cultural, linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines.72  The northern part of 
Sudan has a long history of human settlement where ancient civilizations flourished along 
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the Nile.73 By the 8th century AD Arabs from Egypt began arriving in Sudan, which 
slowly began to spread Islam across the region.74  The 19th century brought the presence 
of the Turks and Egyptians, the Mahdist state and then finally British colonialists.  The 
southern part of Sudan is made up of the Nilotic peoples who have been in the region for 
centuries; they practice agriculture and pastoralism and live for the most part in stateless 
societies.75  Geographic isolation largely protected southerners from the outside influence 
and the spread of Islam, enabling them to retain their cultural and social heritage and their 
political and religious institutions.76 It was not until the 19th century that the slave trade 
brought southerners into contact with their northern neighbors.  Arab slave traders preyed 
upon southerners, resulting in deep hatred for northerners and significant fear and 
suspicion that has lasted into the 21st century.77    
In 1899, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium set up joint authority over the Sudan 
region by Britain and Egypt, however Britain largely assumed responsibility for 
governing the territory.78  The British had separate policies for northern and southern 
Sudan. In the north they focused on economic development and modernizing the 
government in Khartoum, but they virtually ignored the already underdeveloped south, 
economically, politically and socially.79  The economy in the south suffered due to the 
region’s isolation, lack of education and the unwillingness to divert resources from the 
north to the south in order to stimulate economic development.80  Civil unrest throughout 
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Sudan and the demand for self-determination from colonial powers eventually led the 
British to leave Sudan, allowing Sudan to declare independence in 1956 without conflict. 
However, the newly independent government inherited many problems that would lead to 
decades of conflict and civil war between the north and the south.  
Grievances 
Since Sudan’s independence, the Arabs in the north had been in control of the 
government; creating economic, military, political and social policies for the entire 
country and denying any representation for peoples other than themselves in the 
governing process.81  The Sudanese government had also alienated the southern Sudanese 
with the imposition of Islamic law and concentration of resources in the north.82 The 
marginalization of southerners by the central government would ultimately lead to the 
unrest by the southerners and ignite their desire to be free of the Khartoum government.  
Sudan has been in near constant conflict since it gained independence in 1956, 
with almost continual armed rebellion in the South from 1955 to the early 2000s. The 
first Sudanese Civil War began on the eve of Sudan’s independence as the Muslim’s in 
the north prepared to take over control of the government and unite Sudan under one 
religion and one culture. The Southerners, who were deeply rooted in African culture, 
were afraid of becoming second-class citizens and thus exploited by the Muslim 
government in Khartoum.  The southern army officers mutinied in 1955, eventually 
forming the Anya-Nya guerrilla movement that fought for separation.83  Several hundred 
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thousand Sudanese died and thousands fled to neighboring countries during the war.84 In 
1972 the Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed, which gave the South limited 
regional autonomy and their own government. However, subjugation of the south 
continued even after the peace agreement was signed, especially after it was discovered 
that the southern region was sitting on large oil reserves.85  The Khartoum government 
systematically violated the Addis Ababa agreement.  They imposed Islamic law and set 
out to re-divide the South. Not only was a major project carried out that would change the 
natural flow of the Nile by diverting large amounts of water directly to the North, but the 
government also changed the borders so that newly discovered oil fields were shifted 
from the South to the North.86  Southern soldiers and officers in the Sudanese army 
rebelled and created the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), sparking the Second 
Civil War in 1983.  The government in Khartoum began forcibly removing people from 
their land in and around the oil fields in Southern Sudan.  Reports by Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, ECOS and other organizations reported that not only were 
hundreds of thousands of people violently displaced, their villages emptied and houses 
burned, but tens of thousands of people were killed, wounded, raped, and boys and girls 
abducted in order to secure oil fields.87   
Road to Secession 
South Sudan’s first attempt at regional autonomy was through the Addis Ababa 
Agreement following the First Sudanese Civil War. The agreement was doomed to fail 
from the outset as few northerners or southerners actually supported the agreement.  
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Inedeed, many of the southern commanders and political leaders were not even aware of 
the agreement until it was publicly announced.88  The Anya Nya guerillas that had fought 
for separation were fighting for complete independence, not regional autonomy, and 
therefore were vehemently opposed to the agreement. The central government in 
Khartoum had no intention of granting the south real autonomy, but it was a way to end 
the civil war and still maintain control of the South.89  The Sudan government under 
President Jaafar Nimeiri rescinded recognition of South Sudan’s regional autonomy in 
the early 1980s and split the region into three independently governed regions and 
imposed Arabic as the official language.90  These actions led to the formation of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), as well as a political arm, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the breakout of another civil war.91  
The Second Sudanese Civil War lasted for 22 years.  While atrocities were 
committed on both sides, the Sudanese central government was especially brutal on the 
civilian populations in the south. Not only did the government of Sudan use aerial 
bombardments and helicopter gunships to attack the southern Sudanese population, but 
they also used food as a weapon by refusing to allow food to reach civilian populations.92  
An estimated 2.5 million people were killed and over 4.5 million displaced during the 
war.93  The war finally came to an end in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA.  The CPA 
committed the state to holding a self-determination referendum in the south, which they 
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set to vote on in 2011.94 Unsurprisingly, the South voted almost unanimously in favor of 
secession, leading to the creation of South Sudan on July 9, 2011.  
International Community Reaction 
The United States, European governments, the U.N. General Assembly, and the 
U.N. Human Rights commission all condemned the government of Sudan for its human 
rights abuses during the Sudanese Second Civil War.95  Sudan’s neighboring countries of 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda also provided support to the South Sudanese in a number 
of ways. Eritrea broke its diplomatic relations with the Khartoum government in 1994 in 
a public display of support for the South Sudanese, and also allowed the opposition 
forces training bases in west Eritrea.96  Uganda also strongly supported the SPLA, 
providing them with weapons and territory for training.97 Ethiopia was more discreet with 
its support, but it also provided territory for training to the SPLA.98 
The leading powers in the international community provided humanitarian 
assistance to Sudan and played an important role in supporting the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that would eventually end the conflict 
between the Sudan government and the SPLM/A.99 The United States played a key role 
in supporting South Sudan’s independence.  A bipartisan coalition pushed for two 
decades to have Sudan be a foreign policy priority and helped bring the war-ravaged area 
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to the attention of the international community.100  The U.S. was also the leading donor to 
South Sudan’s cause.  During the Clinton administration, more than $20 million surplus 
U.S. military equipment was sent to the frontline states of Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia 
to help push back military gains made by the Sudanese government.101  The Clinton 
administration also placed Sudan on the state sponsor of terror list and imposed 
comprehensive economic sanctions, putting additional pressure on the Khartoum 
government to change their behavior.102  President George W. Bush also supported the 
South Sudanese cause and appointed a special envoy to focus on peace negotiations in 
Sudan, which were finally realized in 2005 with the signing of the CPA.  After the CPA 
was signed, the United States was the largest financial contributor to the U.N. 
peacekeeping mission and a key donor for ceasefire monitoring and other efforts to 
mitigate conflict.103  U.S. support and the support of the international community played 
an important role in seeing to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan and that the self-
determination of the South Sudanese people was realized. 
Quebecois 
Historical Context  
Quebec is the largest of Canada’s ten provinces and has a unique heritage and 
culture.  On two separate occasions, the Quebec provincial government has held 
referendums allowing for the Quebec electorate to vote on the question of Quebec 
independence.  On both occasions, the population rejected the provincial government’s 
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proposal and voted to stay with Canada. Despite these defeats, separatist parties remain 
active in Canadian politics, still pushing a nationalist agenda and more autonomy for the 
Quebec province. Founded and colonized by the French, Quebec was surrendered to the 
English following the French and Indian wars and Treaty of Paris in 1763. Undeterred by 
the surrounding Anglophone populations, Quebec kept its distinct French heritage and 
culture, the only place in North America where the majority of people speak French. It 
was not until Quebec society began undergoing significant changes in the 20th century 
that Quebecers began to feel that their distinct culture was under threat and needed to be 
preserved.  
Grievances 
In the late 1960s, inspired by events around the world like the decolonization in 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, the Cuban Revolution, and the American Civil 
Rights Movement, a Quebec nationalist sentiment was beginning to stir in the 
province.104  At the time, Anglo-Canadian interests largely dominated the Quebec 
economy, with French Canadians salaries being on average 35% lower than those of 
Anglophones, leading many to feel that there was a form of internal colonialism 
happening in Quebec and that French Canadians were being treated as second-class 
citizens.105  But Quebec nationalism was mostly driven out of the fear that the majority 
Francophone population was struggling to keep its unique identity in a predominantly 
Anglophone Canadian federation.  The fear of assimilation in Quebec with that of the 
English-speaking majority in Canada nourished nationalist sentiment, leading many to 
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believe that the only way to keep Quebec’s unique French culture would be to create an 
independent Quebec.   
Road to Secession 
The Quebec independence movement began in the 1960s, commonly referred to 
as the “Quiet Revolution”, during a time when Quebec society was undergoing 
considerable changes and modernization. The nationalist ideology of the 1960s was 
largely focused on giving Quebec more control of the economic, social and cultural 
development in the region.  Quebec nationalists wanted to bring about social and 
economic change and believed the only way to achieve this was by gaining more control 
of the Quebec province.  The movement to defend the Quebecois culture and improve 
their economic and social status won its first victory with the election of the Quebec 
Liberal Party (QLP) in 1960.106  The QLP advocated for constitutional reforms that 
would give more authority to the Quebec government in areas like culture, economic 
management and natural resources, believing that greater political autonomy was a way 
to regenerate the French-Canadian culture in the province.107  While the QLP promoted 
more power for the Quebec government and for obtaining special status recognition for 
Quebec, they were not yet advocating for sovereignty in the region. However, growing 
nationalist sentiment led more and more Quebecers to advocate for the independence of 
Quebec.108    
In 1968 the Parti Quebecois (PQ) was formed, advocating national sovereignty for 
Quebec and secession from Canada as their main platform. Yet, polls taken in the late 
1960s showed that only about 11% of the electorate favored independence and over 70% 
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opposed it.109  While support for the movement slowly grew over the years, by the mid-
1970s support for independence was still only around 20%.110  Despite the low support 
for independence, the PQ party came to power in 1976 receiving 41.4% of the votes and 
71 seats, unseating the QLP who only received 33.8% of the votes and 26 seats.111  
Understanding that the majority of Quebecers were not in favor of sovereignty, the PQ 
ran their election campaign as the party of “good government” that would replace the 
weakened QLP that had been marred by various scandals.112   The election victory by the 
PQ came as a shock to many, especially the central government that feared the separatist 
party’s agenda.  The central government, led by Pierre Elliot Trudeau, responded by 
promoting national unity and trying to come up with solutions that would preserve 
Quebec’s distinct character while keeping Canada united.113  During the election 
campaign, the PQ had promised their supporters that a referendum would be held on the 
issue of independence, and in 1979 the party published its intentions in a white paper 
entitled Quebec-Canada: A New Deal. The Quebec Government Proposal for a New 
Partnership Between Equals: Sovereignty-Association (Quebec 1979).114  The 
referendum question was announced on December 20, 1979, however instead of asking 
Quebecers to vote in favor of sovereignty, they asked them to vote on granting a mandate 
for negotiating terms between Quebec and Canada; if it passed, a second referendum 
would take place on the issue of sovereignty once the negotiation was complete.115  Both 
sides began months long referendum campaigns in the run-up to the vote.  Those in favor 
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of sovereignty focused on the collective identity of the Quebecois and the criticism of 
federalism, which the party argued led to inequality and injustice for Quebecers.116  
Those that opposed sovereignty focused their campaigns on the idea that a person can be 
both a Quebecer and a Canadian, while also waging a fear campaign that an independent 
Quebec would mean higher taxes and the loss of benefits and pensions for the 
unemployed and elderly.117  Ultimately, almost 60% of the electorate voted against the 
mandate to begin negotiating terms of sovereignty.  Immediately after the vote, the 
central government started negotiations on patriating the Constitution, eventually leading 
to the Constitution Act, 1982, with the support of all provinces except for Quebec.118 This 
constitutional reform promoted the country’s unity and the central government’s role as 
the legitimate voice for all Canadians, something the Quebecois took issue with, creating 
increased distrust between Quebec and the central government.119  The issue of Quebec 
independence would be voted on again in 1995.  
The second referendum took place in a much different political landscape.  
Between 1980 and 1995, Canada had adopted a new constitution and went through two 
rounds of constitutional negotiations to try and get the Quebec government to accept the 
new constitution, both of which failed.120  Growing frustration among the Quebecois was 
leading more to favor independence, for the first time reaching 45% support in 1991.121  
The dissatisfaction in Quebec reflected in the polls; in the 1993 federal election a 
separatist party, the Bloc Quebecois (BQ), became the first separatist party in Canada’s 
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political history to become the Official Opposition.122  In the 1994 provincial elections in 
Quebec, the PQ defeated the QLP and once again a plan to hold a referendum on 
independence was in the works.123  The arguments during the referendum campaign were 
the same issues raised in the 1980 campaign; those pushing for the “yes” vote focused 
their argument on Quebecers right to decide their future and the preservation of Quebec’s 
identity, while those on the other side argued that Quebec independence would come at a 
great economic cost.124  Ultimately, Quebec sovereignty was rejected once again, but this 
time by a very slim majority of only 1.16%.125  While the separatist parties mostly lost 
their momentum following the failure of the second referendum, the Bloc Quebecois and 
the Party Quebecois both remain active in Canadian politics today.  The Bloc Quebecois 
recently saw a reemergence in the latest Canadian elections on October 21, 2019, 
winning 32 seats, making them the third largest party in the House of Commons.126  The 
election has led many to wonder if Quebec’s nationalism is experiencing a reawakening. 
As a former minister in the Parti Quebecois government said after the election, “We can 
once again tell our Scottish and Catalan friends that in the struggle for self-determination, 
Quebec is back on Monday.”127 
International Community Reaction 
 On July 24, 1967 during the World Expo 67 in Montreal, French President 
Charles de Gaulle closed a speech with the line “Vivre le Quebec Libre!” (“Long Live 
Free Quebec”).  Earlier in the day, de Gaulle vowed that France would accompany its 
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former colony on its road to liberation, stating, “A people – and you are a piece of the 
French people – must not depend only on itself. This is going to happen. I see it, I feel 
it”.128 President de Gaulle’s statements not only gave Quebec’s secessionist movement 
credibility and momentum, but it also thrust Quebec’s political aspirations into the 
international spotlight.129  From then on, the Quebec secessionist movement operated 
under the assumption that Paris would automatically support Quebec as in independent 
country if a referendum on the issue was to pass.130  However, French support for 
Quebec’s independence did not continue with successive French Presidents.  In order to 
warm relations with Canada, France eventually took a neutral position on Quebec 
independence, insisting their policy was one of non-interference.131  Documents from the 
Clinton Administration have shown that the U.S. had reservations on whether they would 
immediately recognize Quebec if the referendum were to pass or if they would be 
included in the North America Free Trade Agreement.132  But for the most part, Quebec’s 
independence movement was seen as a domestic issue in the international community, 
and therefore the policy at large was one of non-interference. 
Kurds 
Historical Context   
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The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without a state to call their 
own.133  Around 30 million Kurds currently live in what is referred to as “Greater 
Kurdistan”, a contiguous region in the north central area of the Middle East, stretching 
across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  They form a distinctive community, united by race, 
culture, language, and history. As one of the oldest peoples in the region, Kurdish tribes 
have come into contact with the Ancient and Medieval Persians, Alexander the Great, the 
Mongols, Ottoman Turks and others, often forced to retreat into the mountains for shelter 
from the more threatening invaders.134  The sanctuary of the mountains helped to 
preserve their distinct ethnic culture throughout the centuries.135  Their long history of 
marginalization and persecution has led them to pursue independence, the roots of the 
modern Kurdish nationalist movement taking hold with the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
after World War I.    
At the end of WWI, when the idea of self-determination was beginning to shape 
international affairs and igniting nationalist aspirations around the world, the Kurds saw 
their first real opportunity to establish a Kurdish nation.  The Allies had drafted the 
Treaty of Sevres that would deal with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, carving up the 
near and Middle East into nation-states.  The treaty also made provisions for an 
autonomous Kurdish state, Kurdistan.136  However, the Turkish Republic rejected the 
treaty and instead negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne, this time without any provision for 
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Kurdish independence or autonomy.137  Since the end of World War I, the Kurds have 
continued to fight for independence and self-government, however they have largely 
fought separate guerrilla campaigns in their individual countries of Iran, Iraq, Syria and 
Turkey.  While the Kurds generally share common identity, there are religious, linguistic 
and tribal diversities among Kurdish groups.  Their inability to form a united front in 
their fight for independence has likely played a role in why they have been unsuccessful 
in establishing an independent Kurdistan.   
Grievances 
 While the Treaty of Lausanne failed to deliver an independent Kurdistan for the 
Kurdish people, their nationalist aspirations were not extinguished.  However, the central 
governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria sought to suppress the nationalist agenda of 
the Kurdish people and force them to assimilate or face harsh consequences and 
oppression.  In 1924, the Turkish government not only banned the use of the Kurdish 
language, but also took oppressive rule of Kurdish areas by burning villages, displacing 
people, and confiscating their property.138  Reza Shah of Iran also had a record of brutal 
oppression of the Kurds, he banned the Kurdish language and national dress and also 
destroyed tribal and other organizations through a program of executions and 
deportations.139  Even after the Shah, the Islamic Republic government in Iran also 
routinely executed Kurdish activists.140  In Syria, the government banned Kurdish 
dialects and prohibited the teaching and learning of Kurdish as well as restricted 
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landownership and revoked citizenship for tens of thousands of Syrian Kurds.141  The 
Kurds did not fare any better in Iraq.  The Iraqi Kurds frequently clashed with the Iraqi 
Monarchy and subsequent Iraqi republic army from the 1920s to 1960s, however the 
hostilities with Baghdad escalated in the 1970s when 600 Kurdish villages were 
destroyed and 200,000 Kurds were forcibly resettled to other parts of Iraq.142  And yet the 
worst atrocities came in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein engaged in ethnic cleansing 
and mass murder.  Known as the Anfal Campaign, 90% of Kurdish villages were 
destroyed.  Human Rights Watch estimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 people were 
killed, leading many in the international community to label Saddam’s actions as 
genocide.143  
Road to Secession 
Throughout the 20th century, Kurdish groups rebelled against their respective 
central governments, often leading to brutal conflicts and wars.  The first real attempt at 
Kurdish independence came in Iran in January 1946 when the Iranian Kurds, backed by 
the Soviet Union, established the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad, becoming the first 
independent Kurdish republic.144  However, the Soviet support for the Kurds was largely 
driven by its desire to pressure the Iranian government to grant oil concessions. Once 
Soviet forces withdrew from Iran in order to obtain the oil concessions, the fate of the 
Kurds was sealed and the Kurdish republic collapsed.145 While no state actually 
recognized the Kurdish republic and it was only able to survive for less than a year, it did 
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manage to inspire Kurdish nationalists everywhere.146  During the downfall of the Shah in 
1979, the Kurds were able to establish a little more autonomy in Iran, but again were 
unable to maintain it for long against the Islamic Republic.147  In 2011, the Iranian 
government carried out a massive military campaign against the Kurdish guerilla group, 
Party for the Free Life in Kurdistan, which left hundreds dead.148 However, the Iranian 
Kurds receive less international attention today than other Kurdish groups, likely due to 
the political repression and limits on international media coverage in the country.149   
In Turkey, multiple Kurdish rebellions were quashed by the Turkish government 
in the 1920s and 1930s, the revolts mostly fizzling out by the mid-century. However, in 
the 1980s the continued inequalities stirred further unrest among the Kurdish people, 
leading to the creation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a group that embraced 
violence and employed guerrilla and terrorist tactics on the government and civilians.  
Proving to be a significant fighting force, the Turkish military has been unable to defeat 
the PKK who remain active in Turkey today.150  However, in 2009 President of Turkey, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, launched a domestic peace process with the PKK in hopes of 
trying to end the violence that had killed almost 40,000 people since the 1980s.151  
However, in 2015 negotiations broke down and conflict resumed between the Turkish 
government and the Kurds.152   
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In Iraq, the Kurds have also frequently revolted against the central government, 
fighting two wars during the 1960s and 1970s.153  In the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, 
the Iranians provided support to the Kurdish guerilla forces in their battle for 
independence and in return the Kurds joined the Iranians in attacking the Iraqi military.  
The Iraqi military under the direction of President Saddam Hussein responded with 
ground attacks, aerial bombing, destruction of villages, concentration camps, mass 
executions and chemical weapons.  Saddam’s Anfal campaign would grab the attention 
of the international community, labeling the attacks as Kurdish genocide.154 
Despite the brutal suppression and persecution of the Kurdish people in the 20th 
century, the Kurds have been able to achieve some success at greater autonomy, most 
notably in Iraq. During the Gulf War, as American forces were driving the Iraqi Army 
out of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up 
against the Saddam regime.  The Iraqi Kurds and Shiites both heeded the message and led 
uprisings in the north and south. As Saddam turned his sights on quelling the uprisings, 
the U.S. and its allies declared a no-fly zone over the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, 
effectively protecting the Kurds and leading to regional autonomy for the Kurdish 
provinces and the creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).155  After the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds were eager to assist and became an important 
ally in the war against Saddam.  In 2005, the KRG was officially recognized as a 
semiautonomous region in the Iraqi constitution.156 In September 2017, the KRG held a 
referendum on independence, which passed overwhelmingly.  However, there was broad 
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opposition for the referendum by the central government in Baghdad, neighboring 
countries, the U.S. and other Western powers.  Baghdad ultimately refused talks on the 
matter and the referendum was annulled.   
For Syrian Kurds, their opportunity at greater autonomy has come due to the 
Syrian civil war between the Assad regime and antigovernment groups and the fight 
against ISIS.  The Kurds have not taken a side in the civil war but instead have taken the 
opportunity to fill the void where Syrian government forces have left, allowing them to 
establish self-rule in two regions.157  The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) has 
governed Kurdish territory in Syria since 2012, and their military has been fighting 
against the Islamic State with the support of U.S. air strikes.158  The Kurds were also able 
to expand their territory after defeating Islamic State forces and pushing them out of the 
region.  However, their growing territory along the Turkish border has led to concerns by 
the Turkish state, leading President Erdogan to launch an invasion on the region. For the 
Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, the path to greater autonomy was only possible due to the 
collapse or weakening of the central government and support from the international 
community, mostly the United States.  However, the international community has been 
very inconsistent in its support to the Kurds throughout history. 
International Community Reaction 
The often-quoted phrase, “No friend but the mountains”, aptly describes the 
Kurdish peoples feeling of betrayal and abandonment due to their history as a stateless 
ethnic group without any faithful allies. Time and time again, the international 
community has come up short in throwing its full support behind the self-determination 




of the Kurdish people.  The United States and Allied nations first considered the idea of 
an independent Kurdish state after World War I.  However, they caved to the demands of 
Turkey and failed to sign a treaty that included a homeland for the Kurdish people, 
ultimately leading to almost a century of oppression and violence against the Kurds in the 
Middle East.   
In the 1940s, the Soviet Union briefly supported the Kurds in Iran, allowing for 
the Iranian Kurds to establish the first Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad in 1946, however 
Soviet support was mostly self-serving and ended once it received the oil concessions 
from the Iranian government.  The Israelis and the Iranians supported the Kurds in Iraq in 
the 1960s, seeing them as a strategic ally against the radical Iraqi regime in Baghdad.159  
The United States also joined its Israeli and Iranian allies in supporting the Iraqi Kurds in 
the early 1970s, providing U.S. assistance in the form of weapons and training.160  
However, U.S. support was covert and they would not commit to a long-term strategy, 
fearing that an independent Kurdish territory would not be viable.161  Ultimately, the 
Israelis, Iranians and the United States rescinded its support for the Iraqi Kurds in 
1975.162  The short lived support would be a recurring theme for the United States and 
other leading powers throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, alternating between 
supporting and ignoring the Kurds.163 
While the Kurds were fleeing Iraqi bombardments during the Iran-Iraq war, the 
international community was debating on whether or not to get involved in the internal 
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affairs of a sovereign state.164  But in 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War after President 
Bush encouraged the Kurds and Shiites to rise up against Saddam, the international 
community determined intervention was necessary to prevent another brutal genocide of 
the Kurdish people. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 condemned Saddam 
Hussein’s repression and called on the international community to do what was necessary 
for relief operations.165  The United States, with the support of France and the U.K, 
declared a no-fly zone over the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, allowing the Iraqi Kurds 
to secure regional autonomy.166  The Iraqi Kurds and Syrian Kurds were eager and 
willing allies to the United States during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fight against 
ISIS, and the United States welcomed their assistance. However, the United States has 
been unwilling to support an independent Kurdistan, fearing that it will upset their allies 
in the region and lead to more conflict and instability. Without full and lasting support 
from the international community, the Kurds have still been unsuccessful in declaring 
their own independent Kurdish state.  
DISCUSSION 
 The cases in this study are all unique, taking place in different regions of the 
world with different histories, circumstances and motivations. Some took a political 
approach to achieving their goals and others experienced brutal conflicts and wars. 
Nonetheless, they all shared the same aspirations of self-government and independence 
for their people. The cases all give meaningful insight into the key factors that are needed 
to make a secessionist movement successful and why in other cases the endeavor may be 
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fruitless.  Each case study looked into the historical context of the secessionist 
movement, the major grievances held by the group and why they wanted to secede, the 
process they took to achieve their goals of secession, and the reaction of the international 
community.  While the current literature on the theory of secession focuses mainly on 
when a group has the “right” to secede, these cases show that a theoretical right to 
secession does not necessarily mean that secession will be successful.  This research 
looked to better explain what key factors are necessary for a secessionist movement to 
succeed at gaining full independence. Based off the data, four main criteria have been 
identified; major injustices by the parent state on the people looking to secede, majority 
support in the region attempting to secede, a weakened parent state, and support from the 
international community and neighboring countries.  
Injustices and the “Right” to Secede 
 As was discussed in the literature review, there is no right to secession in 
international law. However, there are instances when international law will tolerate 
secession, most notably when a people has been oppressed or colonized.  This concept 
falls in line with Buchanan’s remedial right only theory of secession, that a group only 
has the right to secede if they have suffered major injustices. As the first two case studies 
in this research have shown, Bangladesh and South Sudan both met the criteria of having 
suffered major injustices by the parent state.  Looking first at the case of Bangladesh, the 
Bengali spent more than two decades feeling that they were the victims of deliberate and 
unfair discrimination by the central government in West Pakistan. They were largely 
excluded from the decision-making on the countries security, foreign and economic 
policies and felt that their cultural identity was being threatened. But the most significant 
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abuse by the central government was their reaction to the Bengali using the political 
process to push for greater autonomy in East Pakistan. The Pakistan government refused 
to accept the outcome of the East Pakistani elections and instead declared martial law and 
sent in troops to East Pakistan.  The central government went on a reign of terror in East 
Pakistan with the Operation Searchlight campaign that massacred hundreds of thousands 
and possibly millions of people.  Under these circumstances, the central government was 
threatening the very existence of the Bengali in East Pakistan, and therefore secession 
was seen as the last resort and only viable option for restoring peace and security in the 
region.  
Similarly, in the case of the South Sudanese, they had experienced decades of 
oppression and injustices by Northern Sudan.  Since Sudan gained its independence, the 
Arabs in the north controlled the government and implemented economic, military, 
political and social policies that only benefited the north and denied equal status and 
opportunities for the southerners. The central government also tried to force one religion 
and one culture on all of Sudan, threatening the identity of the South Sudanese. The south 
revolted against the north and fought almost continuous wars from 1947 to 2005.  During 
the civil wars, major atrocities were carried out by the central government, displacing and 
killing millions of South Sudanese. Once again, secession was seen as the last resort and 
only viable option for ending the wars between the north and the south and trying to 
secure peace in the region.  
The Kurds have also suffered major injustices by the parent states in which they 
reside.  The central governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria all sought to suppress the 
nationalist aspirations of the Kurdish people and carried out oppressive rule that resulted 
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in the displacement and killing of hundreds of thousands of Kurds over the last few 
decades. The Quebecois on the other hand had not suffered any major injustices by the 
Canadian government, and therefore had less validity in their calls for independence. 
While some Quebecers have argued that as French-Canadians they are treated as second-
class citizens, the major push for secession was to protect the unique cultural identity in 
the province.  According to Buchanan, a group does not have the right to secede from a 
just state. While international law does not forbid secession from a just state, it leaves the 
decision to the domestic law and politics of the state to decide the outcome. 
Majority Rule  
 The cases in this study have also shown that having majority support in the 
territory that wishes to secede is a critical factor in determining if secession will be 
possible. This also falls in line with both the remedial right theory and primary right 
theory, which both state that having a majority in favor of secession is necessary.  The 
Bengali made their desires known in the overwhelming election victory of the Awami 
League that demanded an autonomous state and limiting the power of the federal 
government in East Pakistan. For the South Sudanese, their chance to show they had 
majority support was in the 2011 referendum, where 99% of South Sudanese voted to 
secede from the north. In the cases of the Bengali and South Sudanese, there was no 
denying they had majority support in their territory.   
 For the Kurds, the case of majority support is a bit more complicated.  While the 
Kurds make up the majority in the region referred to as Kurdistan, their minority status in 
the countries in which they reside along with the separate Kurdish groups that have 
formed, makes it much more difficult to form a united movement for an independent 
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Kurdistan.  Currently, the push for greater autonomy in the countries they reside has 
proven to be the best option for many Kurdish groups.  However, even in Iraqi Kurdistan 
where a clear majority voted in favor of independence in the 2017 referendum vote, the 
government refused to recognize the referendum and the vote was invalidated.  For the 
Quebecois, their failure to receive majority support in two separate referendum votes 
sealed their fate in being able to achieve their goal of independence.  Without a clear 
majority, they could not move forward with negotiations with the Canadian government 
on the issue of secession.  
Weakened Parent States 
 The third key factor in the success of a secessionist movement is the strength of 
the parent state.  For the Bengali, the opportunity for independence came after the 
Pakistan government was defeated in the Indo-Pakistan war. While the war only lasted 13 
days, the swift defeat of the Pakistan military allowed the Bengali to declare 
independence.  South Sudan also benefited from the weakness of the central government 
in Khartoum.  The increasing pressure from the international community to end the civil 
wars and allow for a referendum to be held on the issue of South Sudan independence, 
gave the Sudan government little choice but to comply.  
 For the Kurds and the Quebecois, the relative strength of the parent states made 
secession much more difficult. A 1960 intelligence report by the CIA argued that the 
Kurds of Iran and Iraq had the military strength, leadership and possible material support 
from an outside power, the Soviet Union, to make autonomy possible.167  However, the 
report concluded that “only the relative stability of the parent governments stand in the 
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way of active Kurdish separatism.”168  A strong parent state typically has the political and 
military strength to suppress any movements they see as threatening, which has been the 
case in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.  While more recently, weakened governments in 
Iraq and Syria have allowed the Kurds to gain greater autonomy, it has not been enough 
to lead to full independence. In Canada, a strong central government made it difficult for 
the Quebecois to convince the majority of the people in the province that independence 
would be a better option.  The central government’s fear campaign succeeded at making 
people weary of breaking away from the stability of Canada for the uncertainty of an 
independent Quebec. 
External Support 
 Perhaps the most critical factor in the success of a secessionist movement is 
whether they have external support from neighboring countries and the international 
community.  For the Bengali, India played a crucial role in helping them achieve 
independence. Without the support of the Indian Prime Minister and India’s willingness 
to support the Bengali resistance, they likely would not have been able to achieve 
independence in 1971.  The same is true for South Sudan, support from the neighboring 
territories of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda as well as support from the international 
community to not only end the civil wars but to ensure that the referendum on 
independence was held, allowed for the South Sudanese to vote for secession and declare 
an independent South Sudan.   
 For the Kurds, international community support has been mixed and inconsistent.  
Since the end of World War I, support for different Kurdish groups has come from the 
Soviets, the Israelis, Iranians, the Americans, and others. However, support was largely 
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based on strategic considerations to fight other enemies and was less focused on 
supporting the Kurdish self-determination.  The Soviets supported the Iranian Kurds in 
order to gain oil concessions from the Iranians.  The Israelis, Iranians, and Americans 
supported the Iraqi Kurds in order to help quell the Iraqi government in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, but quickly abandoned them by the mid-1970s.  The United States has 
gone on to support the Kurds when it has been strategically advantageous in Iraq and 
Syria, but has failed to continue its support once its strategic objective was realized or 
abandoned. One of the major issues for supporting the Kurds has been the uncertainty 
that an independent Kurdistan would be viable.  As a landlocked region, Kurdish territory 
would be surrounded by likely enemies, causing further instability in an already unstable 
region.  For the Quebecois, without any major injustices to warrant international 
community intervention, they had little hope of garnering support from external powers.  
The issue of Quebec independence was seen solely as a domestic issue, and therefore the 
international community stayed on the side of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of 
a sovereign state.  
CONCLUSION 
 From Catalonia to Scotland, Ambazonia to Kurdistan, nationalist groups continue 
to seek independence around the world. The 20th century saw the emergence of the 
principle of self-determination and the right of people to determine their political fate.  
Growing nationalist aspirations has led to a drastic increase in secessionist movements 
seeking to secede from existing sovereign countries. However, secessionist movements 
rarely achieve their goals of gaining independence.  Current literature on the theory of 
secession focuses on what gives a group or people the right to secede, but focuses less on 
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the likelihood that a secessionist movement will actually be successful in achieving 
independence. This research study has looked to fill this gap by identifying four main 
criteria that make a secessionist movement more likely to succeed; suffering major 
injustices carried out by the parent state, majority support in the territory looking to 
secede, a weakened parent state, and the external support from neighboring countries or 
the international community.  While these are not the only factors that will determine the 
likelihood of a successful secessionist movement, they have all proven to be of critical 
importance in the success or failure of secessionist movements. The cases in this study 
have also shown nationalist aspirations and secessionist movements often result in 
extreme violence and war, which has the potential to threaten international peace and 
security.  The continued activities of secessionist movements around the world make it 
clear that this topic remains of critical importance to global security.  However, as 
Donald Horowitz and Michael Jewkes pointed out, further research is needed on how to 
address the grievances and nationalist aspirations of minority groups without each group 
demanding the right to secede.  Secessionist movements are rarely successful, and when 
they are, it typically comes at a great cost.  The focus for future research should be on 
post-secession and whether or not gaining independence leads to peace and stability. 
While redrawing borders to accommodate self-determination may have been the right 
choice following decolonization, secession may not be the answer for the future of 
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